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Abstract: This study examines differences in the amount of economic support or mutual benefit 
derived from extended family living arrangements by studying differences in monetary 
contributions to essential household expenditures across family units in extended family 
households. Using the 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation, multivariate regression 
and selection models are estimated to assess racial differences in family contributions toward 
household expenses in extended family households. Extended family households have very 
unequal monetary contributions towards household rent and utilities, although Hispanics have 
less unequal monetary contributions compared to other racial groups. Hispanic and Asians 
extended family households experience decreasing inequality in financial contributions as the 
income of each family increases whereas no relationship between financial contributions and 
income is found for whites or blacks. This suggests a different cultural orientation to extended 
family living arrangements for Asians and Hispanics compared to non-Hispanic whites. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The proportion of the population living in extended family households has steadily 
increased from 12 percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 2012, with even higher rates among 
race/ethnic minority groups (Fry and Passel, 2014). Despite this increase in extended family 
households, information on the economic organization within these households is relatively 
sparse. Higher rates of extended family households among minority and impoverished groups 
have often been attributed to economic necessity with little attention paid to the extent the 
economic need was of all members in the household or just some members of the household. As 
the number and proportion of people living in extended family households has increased, the 
heterogeneity in the factors that precipitate their formation as well as the differences in 
expectations that accompany their formation have undoubtedly changed. For example, the extent 
to which these households are formed in response to chronic versus episodic vulnerability among 
low-income families is unclear. Economic motivations for extended family households could be 
to make living arrangements more affordable or to assist family members in need. Although 
society has seen an increase in the incidence of residential phenomena such as cohabitation and 
extended family living arrangements, the economic organization of these households in which 
complex familial relationships evolve is not well understood (Cherlin, 2010). Nor is it clear the 
extent to which organizational difference may reflect differences in socioeconomic status, racial 
differences in cultural expectations, or some combination. 
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Extended family living arrangements are often framed as an informal safety net for 
family members in need or as a cultural preference for living with extended kin (Kamo 2000; 
Pilkauskas, Garfinkel, & McLanahan, 2014). As such, the limited work on the economic 
organization of these households has focused on who supports who within the household using 
income receipt of members (Cohen and Casper, 2003; Kahn, Goldscheider, and García-
Manglano, 2013). However, the benefits may be mutual and exchanges may occur across 
generations (Pilkauskas, 2012). Further, income receipt within households may not correspond 
with the economic organization of these households, given prior research has found the 
distribution of resources within households to be unequal (Himmelweit et al., 2013). Therefore, 
income receipt may not match up with actual monetary support to household expenses. Raising 
the question, do individuals who move in get a “free ride,” or is there an expectation of a 
financial contribution?   
Income dynamics within extended family households have remained relatively 
unexplored; thus, in this research, I begin to unfold the patterns of these within-household 
income dynamics. Prior research on within-household income inequalities has tended to focus on 
gendered inequalities of economic decision-making within couples; however, the greater 
complexity of household forms in contemporary society requires an amplification in the scope of 
our thinking about household economic processes (Himmelweit et al., 2013). This study will 
examine the within-household economic dynamics of extended family households. Racial 
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differences in within-household economic dynamics will also be examined to assess the extent to 
which differences may reflect both cultural expectations and economic differences across groups.  
BACKGROUND 
Shared Living Arrangements 
Shared living arrangements occur in many forms, with the extension of generations both 
vertically and horizontally. This article focuses on extended family households, defined as a 
household with any relative that is not the spouse/partner of the householder or child under the 
age of 25. Extended family households may include parents or adult children. They may also be 
extended horizontally to include other family relatives such as siblings, aunts, and cousins. This 
paper uses the household reference person to define the primary or host family within the 
extended family household and identifies all other family units within the household as auxiliary 
families.  
Racial and ethnic minority families are significantly more likely to live in extended 
family households than whites (Kamo 2000; Keene and Batson, 2010). Differences across groups 
have been attributed to both economic reasons and cultural preferences (Kamo and Zhou, 1994; 
Burr and Mutchler, 1992). Blacks and Hispanics have higher rates of poverty and lower 
household incomes (Dockterman, 2011), which may make pooling resources more beneficial 
(Angel and Tienda, 1982). Additionally, black and Hispanic households have a net-worth of 
about $6,000 compared to white households who have a net-worth of about $113,000 (Taylor et 
al., 2011). This wealth disparity suggests that in times of economic need blacks and Hispanics 
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may need to rely more on family since they have less wealth to weather a rough patch. Stronger 
cultural norms for caring for family in need may also contribute to higher rates of extended 
family households among Hispanics and Asians (Burr and Mutchler, 1999). A key question then 
involves whether different household structures and organization primarily reflect socio-
economic status, racial differences in how families are expected to function, or some 
combination of the two. 
Extended family households can be formed with either of two basic economic 
understandings: informal social assistance or mutual benefit. Families may provide help 
altruistically, based on need, which has been found in help from parents to children (Fingerman 
et al., 2009; Ward and Spitze, 2007). This one-sided type of help would be an example of 
informal social assistance. Families may also share the costs of household expenses to gain 
economies of scale and provide a mutual benefit to both families. An important note is that the 
focus of this study is on monetary support, and does not measure non-monetary support that may 
be exchanged within households, such as unpaid childcare.  
 Research that has looked at economic inequality in extended family households has 
concentrated on income in co-residential parent–child dyads, noting the shift over time towards 
parents having a greater share of the combined income and the stability of households with more 
income inequality (Glick and Van Hook, 2011; Kahn et al., 2013; Ruggles, 2007). Although 
support mostly flows from parents to children, this is not always the case, and deviations from 
that pattern are particularly common for certain groups. For example, assistance has been found 
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to flow from children to parents in low-income and minority families (Fuligni, 2007; Napolitano, 
2015; Sanchez et al., 2010). Qualitative work has found that, in middle-class families, most 
young adults who return to parental homes do not contribute financially to the household, 
regardless of income, and that those that do contribute, do so only begrudgingly (Sassler et al., 
2008). On the other hand, for adult children in low-income families, contributing financially is 
much more common (Napolitano, 2015). Although qualitative work has provided a picture of 
how extended family households operate in distinct ways for certain subgroups, we know far less 
at the population level about group differences or how these households function economically. 
 Sharing one house might be more economical for both families involved in a multifamily 
living arrangement. The commonly presumed dichotomy of one generation supporting the other 
does not reflect the complexities of extended family households, some of which may not be able 
to survive without multiple earners. The 1960s saw a large influx of wives into the labor market 
due to economic shifts that required couples to put both members into the workforce in order for 
their households to maintain their economic position (Oppenheimer, 1973). Hence, it may be that 
when marriages remain intact and both spouses work, the household unit can remain as a single 
family, whereas individuals who do not marry or who divorce (delayed marriages and divorces 
being more common today than in the 1960s) must seek alternatives to the dual-earner couple 
model by joining or forming extended households. Extended family households are more 
common among unmarried mothers compared to those who are married or cohabitating 
(Pilkauskas, 2012). 
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Theoretical Perspectives and Current Study 
Economic theories of inter-household transfers and kinship have mostly focused on 
interaction between couples in households, with support theorized as altruistic, an exchange, or 
collective (Becker, 1981; Bennett, 2013; Himmelweit et al., 2013). Collective models of 
household resource sharing suggests shared priorities, an agreed upon definition of fairness, and 
sufficient flexibility to renegotiate arrangements when circumstances change. The more people 
involved and the greater the uncertainty about the future, the more difficult this becomes (Beck 
and Beck, 1984). Households with multiple families contributing to rent and utilities imply a 
level of cooperation that suggests a collective orientation to household economics. Inter-
household transfers within extended family households may occur altruistically without an 
expectation of reciprocity to help family members in need. When one family pays all of the rent 
and utilities, this would suggest an altruistic orientation. Exchange theory suggests some sort of 
exchange in resources, similar to theories of the division of labor within the household (Becker, 
1981; Bennett, 2013; Pollak, 2005). Exchanges that include non-monetary contributions are 
unable to be assessed in the current study. 
Intergenerational solidarity theory provides a framework for understanding private 
welfare support, as the theory provides the base for contemporary research on intergenerational 
relationships. This theory identifies several factors on which support depends, including need, 
closeness, and norm of obligation (Bengston et al., 2002). Intergenerational support, both “up” to 
parents and “down” to children, is thought to be motivated by altruism, reciprocity, and feelings 
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of family obligations (Seltzer and Bianchi, 2013). Closeness of relations may infer a greater 
acceptance of providing support for families, so those extended up or down may be less likely to 
be making economic contributions. On the other hand, horizontal relations may be less close and 
have a greater expectation of contributions. Contingency theory would predict that this support is 
available in times of hardship and directed to members with the greatest needs (Fingerman et al., 
2009). Within shared living arrangements, the primary family who is able to maintain a home, 
likely has less need, therefore the host may be expected to shoulder a majority of the costs to 
maintain the household (Cohen and Casper, 2002).  
Racial differences in intergenerational support may be rooted in cultural preferences and 
normative expectations. Older black and Hispanic adults are more likely to agree that each 
generation should provide assistance through shared living arrangements (Burr and Mutchler, 
1999). Normative differences in filial assistance by race have also been found in surveys of 
younger generations, with Asian and Hispanic youth feeling more obligation to help parents than 
non-Hispanic white youth (Fuligni, 2007). Racial and ethnic norms of obligation may define 
responsibilities to family and potentially expand one’s sense of obligation to a wider array of 
extended kin, suggesting more familial support to horizontal family ties. Stronger norms for 
assistance across generations in minority families may suggest that shared living arrangements 
are used to provide economic support to family in need. 
The decision to live in an extended family household is likely influenced by some 
combination of preferences and economic motivations. Among economic motivations, extended 
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family households may form as a strategy for coping with low-wage and involuntary part-time 
employment or as a response to individual hardships to weathering economic rough patches. One 
way to gain leverage on the economic function of extended family households is to assess their 
economic organization. If these households form under mutual benefit one would expect all 
families in each household to be contributing financially. On the other hand, if these extended 
family households form in response to individual hardships, one would expect one family to 
provide resources for its co-residential family in need. 
In this paper, I draw from theories of inter-household transfers, intergenerational support, and 
filial responsibility to study familial support in shared living arrangements. I focus on individual 
family units’ contributions to essential household expenditures within extended family 
households. I assess three related questions: 
1) What is the economic organization of extended family households? How are monetary 
contributions divided among families within extended family households? Living 
arrangements can provide a private welfare function or form under mutual support. 
Altruism and contingency theory would suggest these living arrangements are providing 
a social safety-net to those in need. On the other hand, collective models suggests shared 
living arrangements have a mutual benefit. I hypothesize collective households will be 
more common among those with fewer household resources.  
2) Do auxiliary families contribute money towards the household expenses according to 
their financial means or their familial relationships? Intergenerational solidarity theory 
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suggests that providing resources to family is more likely among closer relations, such as 
vertical extensions as opposed to horizontal. A collective household model would 
suggests contributions correlate to a families’ ability to contribute. I hypothesize 
contributions to household expenses will be made according to family’s ability to 
contribute, with families with more income contributing a greater proportion of 
household expenses.  
3) Are the economic strategies and organization of household monetary contributions 
different across race and ethnic groups? Are racial differences in financial contributions 
moderated by the level of family income? Racial minorities’ stronger normative 
obligations of providing assistance might suggest racial minorities will be more likely to 
benefit from a private welfare function of extended family households (Burr and 
Mutchler, 1999; Fuligni, 2007). On the other hand, blacks and Hispanic families often 
have fewer resources and may be more likely to live in households in which all members 
must contribute in order for the household to survive. I hypothesize that contributions 
will be most equal in black and Hispanic households given the structural determinants of 
disparities for these groups, but once controlling for these structural determinants 
contributions will not differ across groups.  
DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
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The data for this study come from the fourth wave of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP; http://www.census.gov/sipp/), which provides a nationally representative 
sample of 36,147 households in the U.S., along with information on all members living within 
the household. Wave 4 of SIPP collects detailed information on living arrangements, income, 
employment, monetary contributions to household expenses, and health in 2009. The sample is 
limited to the 4,650 extended family households without unrelated adults. Of these extended 
family households, 148 households are excluded because the household reference person is of 
“other” race, 437 households are excluded because all members are younger than age 25. 
Additionally, 151 cases are dropped because of inability to calculate their rental contributions. 
The U.S. Census Bureau imputes missing data on most variables in SIPP using a “hot-deck” 
procedure, therefore no cases in this analysis were lost due to missing data. The final analytic 
sample for this study is the 3,914 extended family households comprised of 7,998 family units 
and 11,368 adults between the ages of 25 and 85. Although information is collected on all 
individuals in the household, typically their responses are answered by proxy of the household 
reference person. Though this may question the reliability of these reports especially for sensitive 
topics such as income, previous work using administrative data has found that the household 
reference person reports other household members’ income with the same level of measurement 
error as they report their own income (Bound and Krueger, 1991). Although in terms of 
monetary contributions to the household expenses, those receiving money may under estimate 
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contributions as has been found among other intergenerational transfers (Kim et al., 2011). The 
implications of reporting bias are further addressed in the discussion.  
For the purposes of this analysis, “extended family households” are those comprised of 
two or more family units as defined by the smallest economic decision making unit within the 
household or the minimal household unit (Ermisch and Overton, 1985). A family unit consists of 
married or cohabitating partners and their unmarried children under age 25 living in the 
household. Family units can take many forms including, an unmarried adult, a couple and their 
children, or a childless couple. Although households can also include non-related extended units, 
such as roommates, the dynamics of these relationships are likely very different; therefore, 
households with any non-related members (that are not a cohabitating partner) are excluded from 
this analysis.  
 A further distinction among family units is made in the analysis to distinguish between 
the “primary family” in the household, which is defined as the family with the household 
reference person, who is the owner or renter of record, and the “auxiliary families” who are all 
the other family units in the household. So, for example, in a household with a married couple (in 
which one of them is the household reference person) and one adult child aged 25 or older, the 
adult child (and each of his/her own family unit’s immediate relatives — i.e., partner and/or 
offspring — if any) would be considered an auxiliary family. Extended family households can be 
composed of one or more auxiliary families (about 15 percent of households have more than one 
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auxiliary family), standard errors are adjusted to account for the possibility of multiple auxiliary 
families in the same household.  
Dependent Variables 
The main dependent variable is the proportion of monetary contributions made by each 
family towards household rent and utilities. Monetary contributions are measured as the amount 
of money contributed towards two key household expenditures: rent or mortgage and utilities for 
the household in the last month. Some households report that they do not pay anything for rent 
and utilities, these households are excluded from the analysis (N=70 households). The household 
reference person reports the cost of rent and utilities for the household (excluding any 
government subsidized rent or transfers) and the amount paid by household members. However, 
the household reference person is only allowed to name up to three people who contribute 
(including themselves). Therefore, households that name three contributors (only 5 percent of 
households name three contributors) with more than 3 adults eligible as contributors (those 18 
and older excluding spouses) are excluded from the analysis, because other household members 
may have also made contributions that are not captured (N=81 households). From these reports 
of monetary contributions by household members, the amount of expenditures contributed is 
aggregated up to the family level to create the proportion contributed for each family towards 
total household expenses.  
 At the household level, a categorical variable is created to assess the economic 
organization of households with three categories: mutual economic support, family safety net, 
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and unneeded family safety net. Mutual financial support is defined as households in which the 
primary and at least one of the auxiliary families are contributing money to household expenses. 
Though contributions may still be quite unequal, these households still suggest a collective 
orientation to their economic organization. Family safety-net households are households where 
the primary family pays all expenses and the auxiliary families have such low incomes that using 
federal poverty thresholds they would be considered in poverty if on their own. The last and 
largest category of households is those with enough resources to not be in poverty if on their own 
yet contribute no income towards household expenses.  
Family Level Independent Variables 
 The primary independent variable is the race/ethnicity of the head of the family, which in 
over 90 percent of families is the same as all members of the family. Race and ethnicity is 
collapsed into a single categorical variable, with respondents classified as non-Hispanic white, 
non-Hispanic black, Asian, or Hispanic. Less than 4 percent of the sample identifies as some 
other race and are excluded from this analysis. Although 90 percent of extended family 
households are monoracial, households with multiple races may have varying levels of social 
support, as a sensitivity test, the analysis was replicated on a sample excluding households with 
multiple races and results were consistent. An indicator of nativity is also included, coded ‘1’ for 
families in which the head is foreign-born.  
Auxiliary families are classified into three mutually exclusive categories of extension 
type based on the families’ relationship to the household reference person: downwardly extended 
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(include adult children or grandchildren); upwardly extended (include parent of the reference 
person); horizontally extended only (include sibling or other relatives). Because these types of 
extension are highly correlated with age of the family head, age is not included in multivariate 
analysis. Education is coded as the highest level of educational attainment within the family: 
“less than high school,” “high school graduate,” “some post-secondary education,” and “college 
completion or more.” 
 Some measures of family characteristics are measured for both the primary family and 
the auxiliary family including: income, the presence of young children, and the health of the 
family members. Income is measured as each family’s total income in thousands for that month 
by combining the individual income for each member of the family from all sources including: 
earned income, social security income, pension income, asset income, and other income from 
government programs. Income is also measured at the household level by combining the income 
of all families in the household to assess the poverty status of the household using the U.S. 
Census poverty thresholds and to create household income quartiles. An indicator of the presence 
of any young children aged 0–4 in the family is also included as a proxy for the need for 
intensive childcare, which may influence both living arrangements and parents’ ability to 
contribute to household expenditures. Further if the primary family has young children, it may 
indicate some exchange that is not captured by the monetary contributions. Similarly, the 
presence of any members in poor or fair health is included, to indicate potential exchange in care 
among families. Homeownership is measured at the household level and indicates whether the 
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living quarters are owned or being bought, typically by the household reference person. Some 
households receive subsidized rent (including those living in public housing) and/or other 
assistance with household expenses, however receipt of these programs is measured at the 
household level, so it cannot be determined if some families use it as a trade-off for determining 
who pays household expenses. Supplemental analysis found no significant difference in 
contributions to household expenses among families in households receiving these types of 
assistance.  
Analytic Strategy 
The analytic strategy proceeds in two parts. First, descriptive analysis of households by 
the economic organization are presented to give a basic understanding of the characteristics 
associated with household economic organization. In the second stage of the analysis, the focus 
is on family units. Descriptive statistics by race for primary and auxiliary families are estimated.  
Then multivariate regression models are estimated to assess racial differences in the proportion 
of monetary contributions to household expenditures among auxiliary families (given near 
universal contributions among primary families). The last step of the analysis quantifies the 
disjuncture between one’s family having income and one’s family contributing to household 
expenditures for auxiliary household members.  
 Although having very low income is a strong predictor of providing support, practically 
speaking, in order to contribute income towards rent, a family must have income to contribute in 
the first place. In order to adjust for the low income that precludes contributions, I estimate a 
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series of Heckman selection models to assess differences in contributions accounting for having 
income to contribute (Heckman, 1979). In these models, two equations are estimated 
simultaneously: (a) a selection equation explaining whether respondents have a “minimum 
amount” of income to contribute and (b) an outcome equation assessing the proportion of rent 
and utilities contributed to the household while simultaneously accounting for the estimated error 
from the selection equation. This model assumes that the likelihood of contributing money to 
household expenses is a function not only of the independent variables, but also upon the 
likelihood that a family has income to contribute.  
The criteria for the selection model of whether or not a respondent’s family unit within 
the household has a “minimum amount” of income is defined as follows. Family income is the 
sum of reported income from each member of the family unit. Because 92 percent of families 
report at least some income and because contributions to the household would be difficult at very 
low levels of income, I consider a family to have a “minimum amount” of income if they have a 
monthly income of at least $580. This amount corresponds to half time at the federal minimum 
wage of $7.25. Among this sample, 73 percent meet the threshold. As a robustness check, 
alternate cut points were tested, yielding similar substantive results.  
RESULTS 
Household Level Descriptive Findings 
The economic organization of two thirds of households was an unneeded safety net 
household, meaning only the primary family paid for rent and utilities despite auxiliary families 
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having enough income to live on their own above the poverty line (Table 1). One-fifth of 
households had mutual support with monetary contributions coming from both primary and 
auxiliary families. Only 14 percent of households had auxiliary families not contributing because 
of very low incomes. Family safety-net households had the largest share of poor households 
(52.9 percent) and those in the lowest income quartile, suggesting these poor auxiliary families 
may be straining already limited resources. A small minority of mutual support and unneeded 
safety net households were poor (7.9 percent and 3.1 percent, respectively).  
Mutual support households had the highest proportion of horizontally organized 
households and the lowest proportion of households with auxiliary families that were 
downwardly extended. Unneeded safety net households were most common among households 
with auxiliary families that are downwardly extended, perhaps reflecting norms about 
contributions from children. Family safety net households had similar types of extension as 
unneeded safety net households, with slightly more upward, horizontal, and mixed households 
compared to unneeded safety net households. 
Most unneeded safety net households were owned by the household reference person. 
This may indicate less need for rent and utilities by the primary family. Family safety-net 
households had the least educated household reference person whereas unneeded safety-net 
households have the most educated, with mutual support households in between. Unneeded 
safety-net households had the largest proportion of non-Hispanic whites whereas safety-net and 
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mutual support households had larger proportions of Hispanics. Safety-net households had the 
largest share of black households.  
[Table 1 About Here] 
Family Level Descriptive Findings 
Next, I present descriptive statistics of families by race/ethnicity and family type in Table 
2 to highlight racial differences in the family contributions to household expenditures and other 
characteristics of both primary and auxiliary families. Nearly all of the primary families 
contributed money towards household expenses across race and ethnic groups. Non-Hispanic 
white primary families contributed 89.7 percent of the household expenses on average, whereas 
primary Hispanic families contributed only 83.6 percent. Hispanic auxiliary families were most 
likely to be contributing rent and contribute the highest proportion of household expenses among 
all race/ethnic auxiliary families. Though Asian auxiliary families were also more likely to 
contribute compared to both non-Hispanic white and black families.  
[Table 2 About Here] 
Primary families were more educated than auxiliary families, and Asian families had 
higher levels of education than other race/ethnic groups but also the largest educational gap 
between primary and auxiliary families. In non-Hispanic white and black families, the auxiliary 
family was more likely to have young children than the primary family, perhaps the 
grandchildren of the primary family head. However, both Asian and Hispanic primary families 
were more likely to have children than auxiliary families; this matches race differences in family 
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extension. The high proportion of primary families with young children in Asian and Hispanic 
families (15.1 and 17.3 percent respectively) provided greater opportunity for auxiliary families 
to provide informal childcare assistance. Non-Hispanic whites and blacks were most likely to be 
vertically extended down with 68 percent of auxiliary families including the adult child or 
grandchild of the householder. Whereas Asians were almost twice as likely as other race/ethnic 
groups to have families upwardly extended with parents of the householder. About a third of 
Hispanic auxiliary families were horizontally extended, the most of any race/ethnic group.  
Having a family member in poor health was most prevalent in primary black families and 
then primary non-Hispanic white families. Primary families were more likely to be headed by a 
married couple than auxiliary families across all race/ethnic groups, though marriage rates were 
high among both primary and auxiliary Asian families. Within race/ethnic group, primary 
families had more income than auxiliary families, especially non-Hispanic white and Asian 
primary families. White households were most likely to be organized as an unneeded safety net, 
while Hispanic households are least likely. Hispanics were most likely to provide a safety net for 
family followed by blacks, with Asians and whites being much less likely to provide a safety net 
for household members.  
Family Level Multiple Regression 
Results so far have suggested racial differences in the economic contributions of auxiliary 
families, with Asians and Hispanics having more equitable economic contributions. However, 
differences may also have been due to differences in family and household characteristics. In 
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order to test whether contributions to household expenditures represent consistent racial 
differences in family economic norms, regression models on the proportion of monetary 
contributions to households’ expenditures are presented in Table 3. In the first stage, only race 
and extension type were included; then, socioeconomic characteristics of the auxiliary family 
were included, and finally socioeconomic characteristics of the primary family were included.  
Model 1 tests whether race differences persist with controls for type of family extension. 
Hispanics auxiliary families contributed a significantly greater proportion of household expenses 
compared to non-Hispanic whites (b=4.62, se=1.29), regardless of family extension type. 
Similarly, Asian auxiliary families also contributed a greater proportion household expenses 
compared to non-Hispanic whites (b=4.20), though not quite statistically significant. 
Respondents in vertically extended upward and horizontally extended households were also 
more likely to contribute than those vertically extended down.  
[Table 3 About Here] 
Once controls for auxiliary characteristics were added to the model, race and household 
extension type differences remained. Auxiliary families headed by a married couple contributed 
a greater proportion of money to household expenses. Surprisingly, families that had a member 
in poor health contributed a greater proportion to household expenses. Perhaps having a member 
in poor health was associated with disability insurance that was used to compensate for care 
potentially received. Having an employed family member was also associated with greater 
contributions, as was auxiliary family income. Overall, these results suggest Hispanics were 
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more likely to have contributed than non-Hispanic whites, regardless of their own economic 
position.  
Contribution of income to the household expenses may not have only depended on the 
resources available to auxiliary families but also the needs of the primary family. Model 3 
controlled for the socioeconomic status of the primary family as well as potential need for care 
by including indicators of any young children and any poor family members in the primary 
family. Auxiliary families, net of other controls, contributed less money to households that are 
owned by the primary family and where primary family has higher income. Additionally, if the 
primary family had young children, auxiliary families contributed less money. This may have 
indicate some level of informal care exchange in these families. Controlling for the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the primary family however did not change the associations 
between the auxiliary family characteristics and proportion contributed. Hispanics continued to 
contribute a greater proportion of household expenses, though the difference was about one 
percentage point lower once accounting for the primary family characteristics.  
In the case of unequal contributions, one reason these may arise is that, simply, some 
families have no income at all, an economic reality which couches household relationships 
differently than when all families do have income but co-reside without jointly supporting their 
shared home. Hence, in the next set of analyses, I accounted for families’ having potential 
income to contribute as having at least $580 (the equivalent of working 20 hours a week at 
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minimum wage). Model 4 included the same controls as Model 3 but was run using a selection 
equation.  
Controlling for having income, Hispanics and Asians had an even larger positive 
association with proportion of rent and utilities contributed compared to non-Hispanic whites. 
Upwardly extended and horizontally extended households also contributed a greater proportion 
to household expenses compared to downwardly extended households. Married couples also 
continued to have higher rates of contributions. Having an employed family member or family 
member in poor health was no longer significant. The economic characteristics of the primary 
family continued to be significant, with lower contributions for houses that were owned and with 
higher primary family income. Respondents who lived in a household that is owned rather than a 
property that is rented by a co-resident were less likely to contribute money towards household 
expenses to the household’s owner. This may suggest that expenses are lower overall than they 
were in a rental unit (where rent is due every month), a situation that, in turn, may have lead to 
lower expectations of financial compensation. Young children in primary families also remained 
significant, which means primary families with young children still provided more resources 
than auxiliary families. Overall, accounting for having income using a selection equation did not 
alter key relationships observed.  
 Given persistent racial differences in the proportion of household expenses contributed, 
an interaction term between race and family income was included in Model 5 to assess how 
consistent this racial difference is across different levels of family income. The relationship 
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between family income and amount contributed was significantly different for Asians and 
Hispanics compared to non-Hispanic whites. The racial differences in proportion of money 
contributed to household expenses observed previously were larger at higher levels of family 
income. The marginal effects of these significant interaction terms were plotted in Figure 1 to 
show the increasing marginal effect of race at higher levels of family income. 
[Figure 1 About Here] 
 As family income increases, the racial difference in contributions between non-Hispanic 
whites and Hispanics increased, as denoted by the gray line increasing up away from the 
reference line (representing non-Hispanic whites). At low levels of income Asians had a smaller 
amount contributed compared to non-Hispanic whites, but as income increases past about $1250 
the different crossed over such that at higher incomes Asians contributions increased. The 
difference between low and high-income Asians households may have accounted for non-
significant differences between non-Hispanic whites and Asians in previous models. Overall, 
racial differences were largest at higher levels of family income, with the proportion contributed 
for Hispanics and Asians increasing relative to their family income, but the proportion 
contributed among non-Hispanic whites did not vary by family income. This may have indicated 
a different cultural understanding and household organization among Hispanics and Asians.   
DISCUSSION 
The first goal of this study was to assess variations in the economic organization of 
extended family households. The findings make several contributions to the literature on family 
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and living arrangements. First, these results show that extended family households are 
predominantly supported by the primary family in the household, with few contributions from 
other household members. The lower number of households with mutual contributions suggests 
that the economic organization of most extended family households aligns with intergenerational 
solidarity theory; the primary household family supports additional members, either to weather a 
rough patch, or to offer an extended period of assistance (Bengston et al., 2002). Many of the 
families not contributing have sufficiently large incomes that independent living would be 
feasible.  Intergenerational solidarity in these extended family households extends beyond just 
those in desire family need, but implies that obligations to shared living arrangements may occur 
for a multitude of reasons.  
Given the large share of unneeded dependence, extended family households may not be 
purely economically motivated. Assistance through coresidence is not aimed solely at those with 
the greatest economic need as contingency theory would suggest (Fingerman et al., 2009). 
However, having income above the poverty line may theoretically be enough to live 
independently, especially in some areas where housing costs are high, independent living may 
still be difficult. Overall, the economic organization of extended family households appear to 
operate under altruistic principles with few families exchanging or pooling economic resources.  
The second question examined the determinants of auxiliary families contributing money 
towards household expenses. While no direct measure of closeness is available in the data, 
vertical family ties are often theorized to be closer than horizontal ties. As hypothesized and 
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intergenerational solidarity suggests horizontally extended families contributed the largest 
proportion towards household expenses (Bengston et al., 2002). Upwardly extended families 
contribute more income towards household expenses than downwardly extended families, 
intergenerational solidarity may be stronger for relationships with children than with parents. 
The expectations between the parent and child relationship may prevail such that parents do not 
want to ask their children to contribute. Suggesting households with adult children are reverting 
to childhood dependency roles regardless of the actual income of the adult child. Adult children 
perhaps are more likely to move in with their parents if they know they will not have to 
contribute as a way to pay off debt and increase savings. Additionally, older parents may 
contribute financially because they are not able to contribute to physical household chores if their 
health is declining, which could account for some unobserved exchange within the household.  
The norms of filial assistance embraced by blacks and Hispanics are evident from a larger 
share of black and Hispanic families operating as a safety-net for families without enough money 
for independent living (Burr and Mutchler, 1999). Asian and Hispanic auxiliary families, 
however, are more likely to contribute to household expenditures than those from other racial 
groups. These families operate on and organize around a different economic expectation; 
namely, that all families contribute according to their means. The extended family household 
function for these Asian and Hispanic extended families does not operate under a contingency 
theory but rather the organization of these households appear to be motivated by an economic 
survival strategy that requires support from all members. Additionally, even once adjusting for 
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having income from earnings, benefits, and other sources, racial differences are found in 
household economic contributions: Hispanic auxiliary families are more likely to contribute 
financially, especially if they have income. Racial differences are most pronounced at higher 
levels of income. Asians are also more likely to contribute financially than non-Hispanic whites 
at high levels of family income. Though even in Hispanic families with mutual support, 
contributions by auxiliary families are still relatively low and rarely reach parity with the 
contributions of the primary family. The duration of coresidence may effect contributions, 
however in supplemental analysis, length of residence in current household was only marginally 
associated with contributions to household expenses and did not change any key findings. 
Suggesting variances in the length of coresidence do not drive these racial differences, but 
perhaps a different orientation to shared households among Asians and Hispanics.  
This study is not without its limitations. First, contributions to the household expenses 
only include monetary contributions for rent, mortgage, or utilities. These expenses represent 
almost half of household expenditures on average, but they do not account for other types of 
spending or unpaid labor that may be exchanged within households (Reichenberger, 2012). 
However, other types of spending within the household are less collective spending for the 
household, so assessing rent and utilities assesses expenses that all members of the household 
benefit from. Research on families in extreme poverty has found that contributions to the 
household may not be through cash, but rather from the contribution of non-cash social welfare 
benefits. For example, food stamps could be traded in exchange for rent (Edin and Shaefer, 
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2015). In terms of unpaid work, we know the number of respondents who report they are not 
working because of care responsibilities is low (Dalirazar, 2007). Contributions to household 
expenses were significantly lower in households in which the primary family had a young child, 
lower contributions may be due to an exchange of unpaid care, though this is not testable. 
However, given Hispanic and Asians primary families were much more likely to have young 
children, this suggests the inclusion of unpaid care work for young children would likely 
increase racial and ethnic differences found in this study given these racial groups already had 
the largest contributions to household expenses. In terms of other unpaid work within the 
household, it is difficult to assess these although qualitative work suggests that adult children in 
extended families perform relatively few household chores (Sassler et al. 2008), but how this 
dynamic might differ by kin relationship and across racial/ethnic subgroups is unknown. The 
inclusion of in-kind support could change the results in some important ways especially for 
blacks, given previous research has indicated high levels of informal support among blacks.  
A second limitation is that this study only captures income from one point in time. 
Reciprocity may play out over an extended period. For instance, a family member may not 
contribute while looking for a job, but once employed, may start contributing. Alternatively, 
families may have moved in with their family as a safety-net when they had low incomes and 
despite new incomes the economic organization has not been reassessed. A third limitation may 
stem from the reporting protocol used in the SIPP. The reference person’s reports may be biased 
towards his/her own contributions. In a majority of households, the reference person is the owner 
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or renter of record, in about 12 percent of the sample the head of the family is not interviewed. 
Amounts of contributions likely vary by who is reporting, however the reporter in the household 
does not vary by race/ethnicity. In supplemental analysis, non-interviewed respondents have 
slightly lower reports of contributing, but including interview status does not change key results. 
Despite these limitations, this study offers new insights into the economic organization of 
extended family households. By analyzing not only the income of different household members, 
but also their economic contributions to key household expenditures, this study improves upon 
prior research. Not only are incomes not equal in extended family households (Kahn et al., 2009; 
Cohen and Casper, 2002), economic contributions are far more unequal than actual income. 
Shared living arrangements are in line with altruistic views of household economics since 
assistance to family occurs with little economic pooling of resources or monetary exchange 
(Becker, 1981). This is an important distinction, especially given the findings that having income 
in not synonymous with contributing income. A majority of our knowledge on the contributions 
of auxiliary household members has come from qualitative studies and has focused on the 
contributions of adult children returning to the parental home (Sassler et al., 2008; Newman, 
2012). Using nationally representative data, the current study allows a more accurate picture to 
emerge of how these households are organized at the national level and, further, can identify 
differences not only across race/ethnicity, but also across different types of extended family 
households. Most families who live together appear to be able to afford to live independently; 
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however, this is less the case for Hispanics, suggesting structural differences in addition to 
cultural differences in sorting families into shared living arrangements.  
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Table 1: Household Characteristics by Economic Organization  
 
Mutual Support 
Household 
(19%) 
Family Safety 
Net Household 
(14%) 
Unneeded Safety 
Net Household 
(67%) 
Poor Households 7.9 52.9 3.1 
Household Income Quartile 
   
1st (Low Income) 16.8 71.5 12.4 
2nd 25.8 17.3 25.0 
3rd 26.2 8.8 29.5 
4th 31.2 2.4 33.1 
Family Extension 
   Downward 43.2 52.7 60.5 
Upward 13.3 13.6 11.5 
Horizontal 33.4 21.4 18.3 
Multiple  10.1 12.3 9.7 
Household Tenure    
Own Home 66.8 59.3 80.9 
Household Size 3.5 3.7 3.6 
Education of Householder 
   
Less HS 19.5 32.0 14.7 
HS 25.5 32.1 27.8 
Some College 35.2 25.9 34.5 
College 19.8 10.0 23.0 
Race of Householder 
   Non-Hispanic White  54.9 40.9 61.2 
Non-Hispanic Black 15.2 24.3 16.7 
Asian 6.0 4.9 4.6 
Hispanic 23.9 29.9 17.5 
Nativity of Householder 
   
Foreign born 24.3 32.2 20.6 
N  740 562 2,612 
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Table 2: Means and Proportions of Family Characteristics by Race and Family Type 
 
Non-Hispanic 
White 
Non-Hispanic 
Black Asian Hispanic 
 
Primary Auxiliary  Primary Auxiliary  Primary Auxiliary  Primary Auxiliary  
Contribute Any Rent 94.4 13.4 93.9 15.5 91.2 18.8 91.6 21.6 
Proportion of Rent and Utilities 
Contributed 89.7 7.3 87.5 8.5 85.4 11.8 83.6 12.7 
Education 
        Less HS 8 12.1 15.9 14.5 8.4 16.5 30.6 29.7 
HS 26 33.2 24.8 36.6 15.9 19.6 24.3 32.2 
Some College 37.3 34.4 42.5 35.1 20.7 25.1 30.8 28.5 
College +  28.7 20.3 16.8 13.8 55 38.8 14.3 9.6 
Young Children Present 3.9 4.6 6.4 8.5 15.1 2.8 17.3 7.8 
Any Member in Poor Health 26.9 20.6 31.2 20.3 22.5 18.6 25.6 20.5 
Married Family Head 51 8.7 31.4 6.9 66.6 30.7 56.2 19.1 
Family Income  $4,641 $1,889 $3,088 $1,442 $4,839 $1,994 $2,960 $1,476 
Family Size 2 1.2 1.9 1.3 2.4 1.3 2.6 1.4 
Family Extension 
        Downward 
 
68.0 
 
68.0 
 
46.2 
 
49.2 
Upward 
 
12.5 
 
7.4 
 
24.2 
 
14.4 
Horizontal   
 
19.5 
 
24.6 
 
29.6 
 
36.4 
Economic Organization         
Mutual Support 18.5 16.5 22.6 22.2 
Safety Net 10.2 20.3 13.8 23.1 
Unneeded safety net 71.3 63.2 63.6 54.7 
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Number of Families 2,343 2,358 745 800 203 243 623 683 
Notes: All values are weighted.   
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Table 3: Proportion of Rent and Utilities Contributed Among Auxiliary Families Using Regression and Heckman Selection (N=4,084) 
                                         No Selection Select on $580 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Demographics  
          Race of Family Head (Ref=Non-Hispanic White) 
          Non-Hispanic Black 1.12 (0.96) 1.69 (0.97) -0.02 (0.97) 0.25 (1.29) -0.29 (2.13) 
Asian 4.20 (2.39) 3.46 (2.27) 3.78 (2.24) 5.46 (3.00) -4.18 (3.62) 
Hispanic 4.62*** (1.29) 4.38*** (1.25) 3.34** (1.25) 5.64*** (1.67) -0.29 (2.80) 
Family Extension (Ref=Downward) 
        Upward  5.74*** (1.40) 6.19*** (1.56) 6.44*** (1.51) 4.59* (1.95) 4.49* (1.95) 
Horizontal  7.38*** (1.11) 7.51*** (1.12) 7.19*** (1.11) 7.00*** (1.42) 6.88*** (1.42) 
Family Head is Foreign-born -1.65 (1.37) -1.88 (1.34) -2.70* (1.31) -2.35 (1.74) -1.73 (1.71) 
Auxiliary Family Characteristics 
         Highest Education (Ref=Less HS) 
          High School 
  
-0.68 (1.28) -0.66 (1.26) -1.29 (1.75) -1.46 (1.75) 
Some College 
  
-0.36 (1.36) 0.86 (1.35) -0.04 (1.84) -0.34 (1.84) 
College  
  
-1.36 (1.53) 1.31 (1.53) 1.08 (2.05) 0.58 (2.06) 
Married Family Head  
  
4.98** (1.80) 5.09** (1.78) 5.87** (2.19) 5.33* (2.14) 
Any Poor Health  
  
3.04** (1.08) 2.37* (1.05) 1.53 (1.39) 1.80 (1.38) 
Any Young Children 
  
1.40 (1.95) 0.56 (1.89) 2.13 (2.70) 1.85 (2.61) 
Employed Family Head 
  
3.66*** (0.93) 2.86** (0.92) -0.37 (1.42) -0.53 (1.42) 
Family Income (thousands) 
  
1.02*** (0.29) 1.16*** (0.29) 0.82** (0.31) 0.35 (0.30) 
Characteristics of Primary Family  
        Homeowner 
    
-6.41*** (1.13) -8.16*** (1.50) -8.35*** (1.50) 
Family Income (thousands) 
    
-0.72*** (0.09) -0.87*** (0.13) -0.86*** (0.13) 
Any Poor Health 
    
0.68 (0.87) 0.66 (1.12) 0.69 (1.10) 
Any Young Children 
    
-4.30** (1.65) -6.38** (2.18) -5.86** (2.16) 
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Race by Auxiliary Family Income Interaction 
        Black by Auxiliary Family Income 
       
0.13 (0.80) 
Asian by Auxiliary Family Income 
       
3.50** (1.33) 
Hispanic by Auxiliary Family Income 
       
2.64* (1.18) 
Constant                                 5.28*** (0.48) 0.72 (1.33) 8.80*** (1.70) 16.04*** (2.69) 17.65*** (2.70) 
Notes: All values are weighted. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
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FIGURE 1: PREDICTED MARGINAL EFFECT OF RACE BY FAMILY INCOME ON HOUSEHOLD CONTRIBUTIONS, CALCULATED FROM TABLE 3, MODEL 5.  
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